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Introduction
As rational economic agents perform in a way that optimally considers the future economic outlook, inflation expectations play a crucial role in macroeconomic developments. Hence, the European Central Bank (ECB) has a clear interest in being able to assess the private sectors short-, medium-and long-term inflation expectations when conducting its regular assessment of the risks to price stability.
ECB's board members regularly claim that stabilising the private sector's inflation expectations is a prerequisite for monetary policy to achieve price stability (Trichet, 2007) : "I confirm once again that we consider the anchoring of inflation expectations to be absolutely decisive. It is because inflation expectations are solidly anchored that we can put the European economy in a favourable environment in the medium and long run with sustainable growth and job creation".
In that respect, the ECB has often referred to market-based inflation expectations. In a recent introductory statement, the President of the ECB states that: "We will do what is necessary to continue to ensure solidly anchored inflation expectations. We are looking very carefully at all […] information we extract from the financial markets" (Trichet, 2007) . Three main reasons are likely to motivate the importance given by the ECB to market-based inflation expectations. On the short-term, it is a way for the central bank to assess the reliability of other inflation expectations measures (e.g. survey-based measures 1 ). Compared to other sources, market-based inflation expectations measures prove to be forward-looking and available at a high frequency for short, medium and long maturities. Given that inflation-linked instruments are priced continuously, market-based inflation expectations measures are supposed to react only to the marginal information contained in the data release. On the medium-term, they provide evidence on the extent to which shocks affecting inflation dynamics are perceived by market operators as persistent or transitory. This might also be seen as a way to evaluate the risks of second-round effects, which may jeopardize price stability. On the long-term, it helps assessing the credibility of the quantitative definition of price stability and finally that of the ECB, as perceived by financial markets.
Market-based inflation compensations measures (swap rates, break-even rates and forward rates) generally capture not only a "pure" inflation expectation, but also an inflation risk premium -that is the uncertainty surrounding the inflation expectation -and a liquidity premium -linked to the institutional characteristics of the markets. The sum of those three components is called inflation compensation, and is what is measured directly on the market. This is not the scope of the present paper to disentangle the various components of inflation compensation. On the one hand, the results of these econometrics investigation are not yet unambiguous (Kim and Wright, 2005 ; Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin, 2006; D'Amico, Kim and Wei, 2008; Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright, 2008) . On the other hand, one may consider that the aim of the ECB is not only to anchor inflation expectations, but also to make the uncertainty surrounding expected inflation as low as possible. Hence, as regards the objective of the ECB, reducing the "pure" inflation expectation and limiting risk premia go in the same way. For this purpose, we only consider in the present paper inflation compensation measures.
The recent developments in market-based inflation compensation measures -that is higher level and volatilities, especially at the end of 2007 -have questioned each of these issues. First, the high volatility of inflation compensation measures to unexpected macroeconomic press releases is likely to restrict their reliability as future inflation measure as, in the same time, survey-based inflation expectations remain well anchored. Second, the higher level of medium-term inflation compensation might suggest higher risks of wage developments transmission into inflation expectations, paving the way for second-round effects. Third, the increase in long-term inflation compensations may question the ECB's credibility. Indeed, if the central bank is credible enough, then macroeconomic surprises should have no systematic effect on long-term inflation compensations.
This paper seeks to assess the impact of a large dataset of macroeconomic surprises on euro area market-based inflation compensations derived from two sources, inflation-linked swaps (ILS) and inflation-linked bonds (ILB), which have recently regained attention in the euro area since time span is now long enough to allow for econometric investigation and related markets have reached significant levels of liquidity.
Our contribution is fourfold. First, we extend the analysis carried out in the related literature to a broader spectrum of maturities, especially to the short-and medium-end. Second, we use an extensive dataset of surprises variables which allows us to exhibit original results. Third, estimating an (E) GARCH model, we take into account possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, as well as asymmetric responses of inflation compensations. Fourth, we estimate time-varying elasticities of inflation compensations with respect to surprises.
Our results suggest that when gauging short-and medium-term term inflation compensations market operators are sensitive to some news' related to real activity and prices. Interestingly, oil futures prices tend to impact on the short end of the inflation curve. However, the significance of this impact seems time-varying and increases at the end of the sample. Notwithstanding, long-term inflation compensations remain generally unresponsive to macroeconomic news, attesting the high ECB's credibility.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature; Section 3 illustrates the dataset; Section 4 presents our econometric investigation; Section 5 elaborates on our results and gives some interpretations; Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper derives from two strands of the recent empirical literature on financial market expectations.
The first one analyses the reaction of interest rates to the unexpected component of data releases (Fleming and Remolona, 1997; Kuttner, 2001 ). The second one analyses the role of communication and credibility in anchoring inflation expectations (Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Gürkaynak and Swanson, 2007) . However, only a very few studies have, so far, analysed the impact of macroeconomic news on inflation expectations.
Using daily bond yield data for the United Kingdom, Sweden and the United States, Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2006) examine the relationship between inflation compensation measures, macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements. They exhibit highly significant responses of forward inflation compensation to economic news' for the US and UK before 1997 -that is before the independence of the Bank of England. They reach the conclusion that a credible inflation target can help anchoring private sector views on long-run inflation expectations. Ehrmann, In the framework of a GARCH model, they test the impact of ECB's communication on the ten-year maturity break-even inflation rate, controlling for some macroeconomic news'. They find a negative relationship between ECB's communicationmeasured as the frequency of the word 'vigilance' in ECB's statements -and changes in break-even rates. Nevertheless, this result is only found for the second half of 2005. Among the control variables, consumer prices in Germany and France, German IFO indicator, French GDP and producer prices prove to be statistically significant.
The paper that is the most closely related to ours is that of Beechey, Johannsen and Levin (2007) .
Using daily forward rates covering three maturities and an OLS estimation, they show that the impact of news' on inflation compensation, although it is tiny in both economies, is higher in the US than in the euro area. They also show that surprises in macroeconomic data have mainly significant impact on short-term inflation compensation in the euro area and rather on long-term in the US. Among other significant variables, French data, especially CPI, but also business confidence and producer price index, play a key role.
Our paper seeks to extend these approaches in studying the impact of surprises on the whole inflation compensation curve, using data both from the inflation-linked swap market and from the bond market.
We also use more surprises notably that related to wages and oil issues. Moreover, following Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) we use a GARCH model. This allows us, using rolling time-windows, to estimate time-varying coefficients.
Data description

Inflation compensation data
We employ two kinds of inflation indexed market data: break even inflation rates extracted from The break-even inflation rate (BEIR) is defined as the yield spread between a conventional nominal bond and an inflation-indexed bond with the same maturity. This is the compensation for inflation that investors require to offset the yield spread between a nominal bond and an inflation-indexed bond (ILB) with the same characteristics. The BEIR provides a proxy of market participants' average inflation expectations over the residual maturity of the bonds.
The ILS market in the euro area is the most mature and largest inflation-swaps market. Contracts are typically structured as zero-coupon swaps and payments are exchanged at maturity based on a preagreed annual fixed rate against a floating rate linked to the euro area HICP index excluding tobacco.
The fixed rate is known as implied inflation rate and compensates the holder of the contract for expected inflation over the life of the contract plus a premium (cf. appendix 1 for more details on the contract). The available maturities of ILS contracts range from 1 to 30 years. Some maturities are more traded than others in the euro-area contracts; indeed, market activity is concentrated in maturities up to ten years. As a consequence, inflation compensation data on short-and medium-term maturities seem more reliable (cf. appendix 2). There are several reasons supporting the use of inflation-linked swap data. Firstly, contrary to ILB data in the euro area, data on ILS contracts have a range of regular maturities from one to thirty years, and the availability of short-maturity contracts enables to assess short-term inflation compensation. Secondly, directly observing compensation rates also removes the need to tackle the issues of differences in time-to-maturity and coupon-payment structures of nominal and indexed bonds. In addition, the declining time to maturity of bonds makes the break-even rates from bond data more sensitive to a seasonality bias linked to the HICP (excluding tobacco) index.
Our sample period is particularly interesting insofar as it contains two different stances of the ECB's monetary policy. First, between January 2004 and December 2005, the ECB maintained its main refinancing rate at a level of 2%. During this period risks to price stability in the medium term rose, reflected by sharp increases in inflation compensations as derived from implied ILS rates showed in fugure 1 below. Second, from December 2005 onwards, the ECB has started to withdraw progressively the accommodative stance of its monetary policy by increasing its official interest rates from 2% in November 2005 to 4% in December 2007. Regarding the five-year forward implied ILS rate five years ahead, we observe an increase in the second half of 2007. But, as mentioned later on, it is rather complex to know exactly the contribution of the "pure" inflation expectation in the inflation compensation, given the presence of some premia.
Some caveats
Some caution is needed when using data on inflation compensation. The main reason is that the implied rate measured from an inflation-swaps contract, as well as the break-even extracted from bond data (and forward rates that can be computed) does not represent a "pure" inflation expectation but consists of a sum of expected inflation over a given horizon and a premium.
This premium can be considered as an inflation risk premium, that is, the premium required for uncertainty about future inflation rates over the lifetime of the instrument, plus a liquidity premium.
Indeed, since inflation-linked instruments have recently been introduced in the euro area, investors may have demanded a liquidity premium for holding these instruments to compensate for their relative illiquidity. Nonetheless, we can wisely suppose that this premium is unlikely to change on a day-today basis since turnover in those markets has strongly increased in recent years. That is the reason why we do not take this effect into account in the remainder of the paper.
All in all, expected inflation and the inflation risk premium are the main components likely to react to macroeconomic surprises. When inflation compensation reacts to surprises, it could be either expected inflation or inflation risk premium, or both. From a central perspective, is all the more interesting to analyse this compensation insofar as the ECB's objective is to deliver price stability in the medium and long runs. If this commitment is viewed as credible by investors and agents, inflation compensations will remain anchored and investors will demand a low inflation risk premium.
Therefore, the two components are (inversely) related to the perceived credibility of the monetary authority in controlling inflation. Thereafter, we use the term "inflation compensation" both for the ILS implied inflation rates and for the ILB break-even rates.
Computation of euro area inflation swap forward rates and break-even rates
Using forward rates presents two advantages in terms of interpretation. Firstly, it makes it possible to correct long-term inflation compensations for volatile variations in short-term inflation compensations so that the forward rates are much less noisy than the corresponding spot ILS rates. Secondly, it enables to study whether a surprise impacts on short, medium or long end of the compensation curve.
That is why we compute here these forward rates for different maturities.
Let n π be the inflation swap rate for maturity n and m π be the inflation swap rate for maturity m.
Then, assuming no arbitrage, the forward inflation swap rate n f m π between m and n is defined: Thus, the forward inflation swap rate between n and n + 1 is equal to:
This definition does not involve any specific assumptions. Our choice is to work with those raw forward rates without using transformation (such as Nelson-Siegel methodology as in Beechey, Johannsen and Levin, 2007) that are likely to bias the results. Indeed, our purpose is to study the market reaction without modification of the signal provided by financial market data.
In addition, break-even inflation rates are computed as the difference between the yield-to-maturity of a nominal bond and that of a real bond or inflation-indexed bond presenting the same characteristics as regards the issuing country and the maturity. In the paper, we focus on break-even rates extracted from nominal and real French bond maturing in 2012, 2015 and 2032.
Surprises data
The data used to estimate the expected and actual outcome of macroeconomic data releases 3 Appendix 3 shows all macro announcements. Most euro area data macro announcements are released later than the US equivalents. The late outturn of euro area statistics is due to the compilation of statistics from euro area countries. As a result, they should contain less information as national releases. That is why we also consider national releases for France, Germany and Italy but also those of the US. Indeed, US announcements may be perceived as an early signal regarding euro area expected inflation and since US macro data are typically released earlier than equivalent euro area data, market participants may draw conclusions about the euro area economy from US data releases.
An empirical examination is done to check whether survey data can be deemed unbiased predictors of the final outcome. It turns out that in most cases, survey data are found to be unbiased predictors. (see appendix 4 for detailed results).
The surprise is measured in terms of a standardised surprise measure (Balduzzi et al., 2001) , computed as:
where R i,t and C i,t are the realization and the consensus (median expectations of a survey panellists) of data release i at time t, respectively, and σ Si is the standard deviation of the forecast error of data release i. Dividing by the standard deviation makes data surprises comparable across macroeconomic announcements.
We also look into the frequency distribution of coincident surprises in macroeconomic annoucements.
For example, in the sample period of 1066 trading days, there are 576 trading days on which there is no release. There are 209 trading days (19.7%) with more than one surprise.
In addition to macro announcements, the estimation also takes into account monetary policy decisions by the ECB. Applied to the ECB's actual monetary policy decisions, the unexpected content of the published decisions can be assessed in comparing actual outcomes of the ECB decisions in terms of the main refinancing rate with the median of analysts' survey-based expectations collected before the Governing Council meetings by Bloomberg. But on the sample period, market participants have perfectly anticipated the decisions taken by the ECB, and the surprise component (measured as the difference between the actual outcome and the median ECB watchers' expectations) has always been equal to zero but at the end of 2005 (beginning of the 'code words' episode). Similarly, we also take into account Federal Reserve monetary policy announcements. Nevertheless, the timing of the publication of the FOMC announcements is at 20:00 (Central European Time) and the surprise (if it exists) must be placed the day after since european indexed markets are closed at that hour.
Econometric investigation
As financial markets are assumed to be efficient, the expected component of macroeconomic data releases is assumed not to have any effect on market-based inflation compensations. Hence, only the unexpected component of the release -that is the "surprise" -might affect inflation compensations. A natural way to analyse the effect of various macroeconomic announcements is to include the full set of surprises in one single vector and to regress the change in inflation compensations on these explanatory variables, whose effects are in that way studied altogether.
As usual in this literature (Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005), we regress, for each maturity, the day-to-day difference in spot break-even rates and forward inflation swap rates on its own lags, on the full set of surprises as well as on specifically financial day-of-the-week dummies, financial variables -Mon and Fri are calendar dummies to account for potential day-of-the week effects;
ε t the residuals.
GARCH techniques are used to estimate equation (1), which is in that case the conditional mean equation. Indeed, it turns out that the series exhibit volatility clustering as well as a non-normal empirical distribution (an excessive kurtosis suggesting that compensation series have fatter tails than a normal distribution). Moreover, the estimation of equation (1) using OLS exhibits heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
The regressions 8 are thus performed for one-year forward rates ending one to nine years ahead (and also for 5-year forward 5 years ahead ILS rates and 10-year forward 10 years ahead ILS rates) and for spot break-even inflation rates with maturities 2012, 2015 and 2032. The specification of the model is chosen according to the Schwarz information criterion (typically, we get L1=3).
The equation for the conditional variance 2 t σ is the following:
The series of n j,t correspond to dummies with n j,t =1 if the news j is released at the date t and n j,t =0 otherwise.
In some cases, we find evidence of heteroskedasticity remaining in the residuals. As a result, we employ an EGARCH model (as in Nelson and Cao (1992) ) as we consider that the effect of surprises may be non-linear 9 . An advantage of this approach is that it does not require us to impose nonnegativity constraints on the coefficients of the conditional second moments. In this case, the 8 The estimations are carried out using a normal distribution or, alternatively, a t-distribution if the Jarque-Bera statistic rejects normality in the residuals. 9 We run regressions using EGARCH estimation techniques to account for potential asymmetric effects of surprises on inflation compensation rates in cases where asymmetric effects were exhibited. 10 We also test for other day-of-the-week effects, but only the coefficients for the Friday and Monday dummies were found significant. 
Break-even rates (maturities 2012, 2015 and 2032)
Overall, most of the variables 11 exhibit a coefficient whose sign is consistent with the intuition: a more optimistic release than expected raises inflation compensation rates.
BEIR 2012
Overall, French surprises prove to be more important in driving BEIR developments than other surprises (see Appendix 5 Table 4 ), which is not surprising given that bond data are extracted from the French bond market.
Surprises coming from price indexes for France, Italy and the Flash HICP released by Eurostat impact positively on inflation compensation, which appears natural in the sense that a higher than expected inflation release is likely to be transmitted to future price dynamics in the short run. The surprise in euro area HICP has the same order of magnitude than the surprise in French CPI, which stands at 0.01.
Real activity surprises such as French industrial production have a significant positive impact. This is a common view that an improvement of the economic outlook is likely to result in a higher inflation.
One notices that national data (Italian and French) appear as much as or even more significant that aggregated European data 12 . This could be explained by the fact that national data are released before European ones, as the latter is the result of the aggregation of the former. Once the European data are published after that of France, Italy and Germany, the surprise component of the euro area release is only marginal.
The positive impact of French non farm payroll surprises tends to attest that job creation in France would result in higher inflation compensations on that maturity. This is not surprising in that sense that increasing job creation today is likely to put pressure on wages and to impact on the future prices developments, in accordance with common views about wages-prices loop. On the short-run, this is not worrying as far as it can be considered as transitory.
Finally, U.S. GDP in advance has a statistically significant effect at short term horizons. Unexpectedly higher growth rate in the United States today is associated with higher inflation compensation in the euro area. The magnitude of the coefficient may be explained by the fact that announcements on those data is made very early compared to European data.
BEIR 2015
Soft data such as IFO business surveys impact positively on inflation compensation rates on that maturity. This might be explained by the fact that IFO is one of the best leading indicators of the euro area growth. Indeed, the surprises on that indicator are known to be strongly market-moving as mentioned by Coffinet and Gouteron (2007) . A higher than expected future growth is likely to increase inflationary pressures.
Regarding oil futures prices, their impact is significantly positive on the 2015 maturity. This effect is not marginal and might reflect the transmission of oil prices developments into medium-term inflation expectations. This result sheds a new light on the risks for price stability arising from oil prices developments. It turns out that the elasticity coefficient is not only significant on the whole sample, but also stronger and much more significant at the very end of the period. This may prove that risks to price stability in the medium-term stemming from oil prices have become higher in the most recent period.
BEIR 2032
Inflation compensation rates extracted from bonds that mature in 2032 respond significantly to few surprises: French CPI and French industrial production with slight significance and M3 surprises.
Surprises coming from the price index for France and industrial production France impact positively at respectively 10% and 5% level. Given that the BEIR 2032 is the expected average inflation over remaining time to maturity -i.e. the year 2032-, one could infer that these effects are due to the short end of the compensation curve (cf. 5.1.1).
Regarding the impact of M3 surprises, the significance depends on the sample considered as we will see in section 5.3. Nonetheless, the negative effect is not intuitive. In essence, the effect of M3 developments on the inflation compensation should depend on the markets' beliefs about the central bank's monetary policy reaction function. The ECB has always emphasized the importance of M3 growth for its medium-term oriented strategy. If the ECB is perceived by market operators to react to M3 growth, then an unexpected rise in M3 is likely to lead to an expectation of interest rate hike and so to a downward revision of inflation compensation rates. Of course, this interpretation should be taken with caution since this impact is low and the significance is at 5% level.
Forward rates
In this section, we extend our analysis to forward compensation rates extracted from ILS spot rates since we want to analyse precisely the term structure effect of surprises. Overall, the results do confirm the picture gained in the preceding section. Almost all the coefficients are of the expected sign, with stronger-than-expected inflation or activity passing on higher inflation compensation rates.
Short-term forward inflation compensations (1-3 years ahead)
One year forward inflation compensation one, two and three-years ahead respond significantly to the surprise component of several data releases: non-farm payroll France, business climate indicator France, GDP Italy, ZEW and Chicago PMI. Each have the expected sign that is to say a stronger-than expected annoucement raises forward inflation compensation rates, probably because of a revision in market operator's beliefs at that horizon: 
Medium-term forward inflation compensations (4-9 years ahead) 13
On the medium-term, few surprises prove to be statistically significant 14 -Similarly, it appears that oil future prices impact the change in one-year forward compensation five-years ahead. This result is consistent with that for BEIR 2015 and illustrates that market operators do believe that oil developments will impact on realized medium-term inflation. 13 For this analysis, we performed regressions for every one year forward compensation rate between one year and nine years ahead but for the sake of concision, we do not present the estimates for which the results are consistent with those of comparable maturity.
Long-term forward inflation compensations (10 years rate 10 years ahead)
On the long-term, the forward inflation compensation rate ten years to ten-years ahead is statistically unresponsive to macroeconomic surprises. These results mirror that of Beechey, Johannsen and Levin (2007) who prove that long-term inflation compensations in the euro area do not react to any macroeconomic surprise. This tends to prove that long-term inflation expectations in the euro area are well-anchored and hence that the ECB credibility remains strong given its objective of price stability.
As a robustness check, we compute Ljung-Box Q statistics for the standardized residuals and it turns out that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation (for all the orders). The 
Variation over time of elasticities for long-term inflation compensations
The results above are likely to be time-dependent, that is the reason why further investigation allowing for time-variation of the elasticities is necessary. We investigate whether the effects of some surprises 14 The estimations yield two counterintuitive results. Nevertheless, when it happens the level of significance is at 10% level. This is the case for the surprise "industrial production DE" which impacts negatively at 10% level the 1y forward rate 1y ahead and for the surprise "CPI FR" which impacts negatively at 10% level the 5y forward rate 5y ahead. 15 However, it should be noted that the time-window is not large enough (only 18 months) to ensure the statistical reliability of the results. This is the reason why the conclusions stemming from this analysis should be taken with caution. -Looking at the effects of M3 surprises on the BEIR 2032, somewhat surprisingly, we detect a significant negative response of compensation rates to surprises in the euro area M3. We provided an explanation of those results before. But this effect became more significant at the end of the sample, probably due to the record level reached for M3 growth at that time and the communication of the ECB regarding that level. Indeed, during the course of the year 2007, in the Introductory Statements of the press conference, the Governing Council expressed a marked concern about the highest rate of M3 growth and the upside risks to price stability at medium to longer horizons which are related. As a consequence, market participants may have interpreted these news in M3 press release as having implications for monetary policy decisions and so for future inflation in the euro area in that particular period. This result is consistent with Coffinet and Gouteron (2007) who show that the relationship between interest rates at medium-term maturities and M3 surprises depends on the ECB communication on its own monetary analysis.
Conclusion
The determinants of market-based inflation expectations in the euro area are not very well known. In this paper, we address this question by using daily data of inflation compensation -the compensation required for expected inflation and inflation risk over the life of the indexed instrument (swap or bond) -extracted from the euro area ILS market and ILB market. This approach has allowed us to address two closely related questions. First, the paper has analysed how short and medium term inflation compensation rates react to the occurrence of some macroeconomic surprises. Second, the paper has investigated whether long term inflation compensation rates in the euro area were deemed anchored on the sample considered. Overall, we found that inflation compensation responds differently to surprises depending on the maturity considered.
Our contribution is fourfold. First, we extend the analysis carried out in the related literature to a broader spectrum of maturities, especially to the short and medium ends of the compensation curve.
Second, we use an extensive dataset of surprise variables. Third, we consider the potentially asymmetric responses of inflation compensations. Fourth, we estimate time-varying elasticities of inflation compensations with respect to surprises.
Our results suggest that when gauging short-and medium-term term inflation compensations market operators are sensitive to some surprises related to real activity and prices. In particular, there is evidence that euro area inflation compensations react more strongly to French surprises. Interestingly, the rolling window regressions reveal that oil futures prices have become more important over time on the short and medium end of the compensation curve. Notwithstanding, long-term inflation compensations remain generally unresponsive to macroeconomic surprises, attesting the high ECB's credibility on the sample considered.
There are a number of questions for future research to address. To begin with, it may be interesting to investigate this issue at higher frequencies with intraday data when it will be available. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the impact of surprises on each component of the inflation compensation and as a matter of fact to be able to decompose this measure since the inflation risk premium is timevarying.
Appendix Appendix 1: Description and characteristics of a zero coupon inflation swap 16
Principle of an inflation swap contract: a zero coupon inflation-linked swap is a bilateral contractual agreement (arranged OTC) in which two parties agree to exchange at maturity a floating-rate payments linked to inflation measured with HICP excluding tobacco party (payed by the "inflation payer") against a predetermined fixed-rate payments (payed by the "inflation receiver"). Insofar as at the trade date, the inflation index value is not known because of a delay in the publication, the two parties take a lagged value of the index (three months in the Euro area). The cash flows are presented in Figure 2 . The inflation leg refers to the net increase in reference index (HICPe) from Ts to Te. The fixed leg refers to a fixed amount which is written as an accumulated rate, b. The rate b is quoted and called the inflation swap rate. This rate will differ depending on the current time and the maturity considered.
Figure 2: Cash flows of zero coupon inflation swap
The rates used in this study represent the fixed rate paid by the inflation receiver (the fixed rate agents are willing to pay in order to receive the cumulative rate of inflation during the life of the swap). The quoted rate is considered as a proxy of expected inflation over the life of the swap. 16 For more details on the ILS contracts, see Deacon and Derry (1998 
Appendix 3: surprises data
Appendix 4: Unbiasedness test and frequency distribution of survey data
We follow Joyce and Read (1999) in the method of testing for the unbiasedness of the median forecasts of economic indicator releases. Simple regressions of the type below are estimated for all data releases:
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Variance equation (2)
ω0 0,0030 *** 0,0005 -0,3477 *** 0,0668 0,0082 *** 0,0014 ρ1 0,0792 * 0,0379 0,9647 *** 0,0084 0,1312 *** 0,0335 τ1 0,5751 *** 0,1050 0,3031 *** 0,0396 0,5695 *** 0,0889 γ Asymetric effect (EGARCH) -0,118 *** 0,029 Adjusted R-squared 0,24 0,28 0 -0,6859 *** 0,0573 -0,4040 *** 0,0394 -0,3815 *** 0,0423 ∆Rt-2 -0,3855 *** 0,0678 -0,2264 *** 0,0443 -0,1910 *** 0,0433 ∆Rt-3 -0,1640 *** 0,0503 -0,1312 *** 0,0425 -0,0990 ** 0,0452 Flash HICP (EA) 0,0047 0,0194 0,0049 0,0046 0,0028 0,0038 M3 (EA) -0,0026 0,0194 -0,0028 0,0032 -0,0018 0,0035 Business climate indicator (FR) -0,0155 0,0183 0,0052 0,0046 -0,0007 0,0062 Unemployment rate (FR) -0,0658 *** 0,0114 -0,0065 0,0044 0,0037 0,0035 GDP (FR) -0,0020 0,0218 -0,0012 0,0088 -0,0034 0,0070 Industrial Production (FR) 0,0056 0,0144 0,0003 0,0039 0,0014 0,0026 Consumer Price Index (FR) -0,0271 0,0231 -0,0081 * 0,0045 0,0008 0,0039 Non Farm Payroll (FR) -0,0113 0,0268 0,0013 0,0053 -0,0019 0,0032 IFO (DE) 0,0259 ** 0,0128 0,0016 0,0029 -0,0005 0,0038 ZEW (DE) 0,0010 0,0281 0,0022 0,0043 -0,0034 0,0037 Industrial Production (DE) 0,0151 0,0194 0,0026 0,0049 -0,0033 0,0047 GDP (DE) -0,0198 0,0273 -0,0120 0,0075 0,0013 0,0087 Consumer Price Index (DE) -0,0081 0,0159 0,0001 0,0032 -0,0001 0,0040 Consumer Price Index (IT) -0,0270 0,0209 0,0019 0,0057 -0,0056 0,0049 GDP (IT) 0,0044 0,0213 0,0019 0,0058 -0,0035 0,0091 Industrial Production (IT) -0,0023 0,0228 0,0075 0,0057 0,0030 0,0050 Hourly wages (IT) 0,0270 ** 0,0108 -0,0029 0,0046 0,0043 0,0047 Consumer Price Index (US) 0,0182 0,0237 0,0019 0,0043 0,0019 0,0035 Chicago PMI (US) 0,0258 ** 0,0121 0,0120 *** 0,0037 0,0047 0,0035 US GDP (US) 0,0149 0,0261 -0,0012 0,0035 -0,0038 0,0060 Oil Futures Prices -0,0104 0,2643 0,0381 0,0599 0,0922 0,0575
ω0 0,0082 *** 0,0013 0,0006 *** 0,0001 0,0006 *** 0,0001 ρ1 0,1418 *** 0,0231 0,0707 ** 0,0325 0,1007 *** 0,0292 τ1 0,5744 *** 0,0714 0,5635 *** 0,1100 0,5689 *** 0,0865 γ Asymetric effect (EGARCH) Adjusted R-squared 0,35 0,14 0,12 Log likelihood 1023,95 2355,71 2408,10 Schwarz criterion -1,87 -4,42 -4,52 Ljung-Box Q statistic (p-values) 0,94 0,76 0,95
